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COURT MANDATED TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED
REVIEW IN E-DISCOVERY: CHANGES IN
PROPORTIONALITY, COST-SHIFTING, AND
SPOLIATION
Graham Streich*
Burgeoning advanced technology-assisted review (TAR) methods
challenge justifications for requesting parties’ burdens and litigant
cooperation in e-discovery. Increasingly accurate and accessible TAR
introduces novel issues in e-discovery, including determining the
proportionality of discovery requests and managing information in
spoliation cases. This Essay recommends reconsidering the judiciary’s role
in e-discovery in light of new technology and argues that courts, particularly
lower courts, need expert technical guidance to adequately address the
issues e-discovery presents.
I. TECHNOLOGY-ASSISTED REVIEW IN E-DISCOVERY
Courts and legal technology experts recognize that TAR can be as good
as, if not better than, human review in e-discovery.1 Thus, courts have held
there is no complete prohibition against TAR; however, courts can allow the
reviewing party discretion in choosing the review method.2 Despite this
broad discretion, many courts have required reviewing parties to demonstrate
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; B.S. & B.A., 2019, New York
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1. See Hyles v. New York City, No. 10 Civ. 3119, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Declaration of Adam I. Cohen in Support of Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Sanctions and Other Relief, Delgado v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-04427, at
*8–9 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 29, 2018).
2. See Livingston v. Chicago, No. 16-cv-10156, 2020 WL 5253848, at *1–4 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 3, 2020); In re Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litig., No. 16-cv-881, 2020 WL 487288, at
*1, *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2020); Davine v. Golub Corp., No. 3:14-cv-30136, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18109, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2017); EORHB, Inc. v. HOA Holdings, LLC, C.A. No.
7409, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 336, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2013); see also Maura R. Grossman
& Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective
and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 61 (2011);
Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use of Predictive Coding in Electronic Discovery: An IllAdvised Judicial Intrusion, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 609, 633 (2013).

139

140

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 90

the accuracy of their proposed review method through statistical sampling
and transparency in the TAR process.3
In the last ten years, storing and processing information has become
significantly cheaper and faster.4 Entities replaced overwritable backup
tapes with user-friendly cloud storage and automated electronic information
systems.5 These technological advancements lower review costs, save time,6
and make e-discovery more transparent and objective because they
standardize the review process.7
Part I.A introduces how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
guide e-discovery, including electronically stored information (ESI)
requests, cost-shifting, and spoliation. Part I.B discusses judges’ traditional
role in discovery and recent e-discovery cases that challenge existing
discovery norms.
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Although the reviewing party usually chooses the review method, the
requesting party may have a strong interest in which review method the
reviewing party uses.8 Given potential information asymmetries,9 under the
FRCP, requesting parties must show the requested information is “relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.”10
The FRCP allows reviewing parties to receive protective orders against
production, or they can shift discovery costs to the requesting party if “the
information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”11
And, under FRCP 26(b)(2)(C), the court must limit the extent of discovery
if, among other reasons, the requesting party can obtain the discovery sought
from a more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive source.12

3. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., No. 1:16-cv-08637, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33140, at *34–51 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2018); In re Actos Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 6:11-md2299, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13307, at *20–42 (W.D. La. Jan. 27, 2014); Moore, 287 F.R.D.
at 200.
4. See Ralph C. Losey, Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A Marriage
Made in Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 9 (2014).
5. See id. at 11–12.
6. See id. at 15.
7. See id. at 27–29.
8. See Hyles v. New York City, No. 10 Civ. 3119, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390, at
*4–10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016); Kleen Prods., LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10-C5711, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at *13–21 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); Moore, 287 F.R.D.
at 182.
9. See Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality
in Discovery, 60 U. GA. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (2016) (explaining courts considering
proportionality issues will have to grapple with agency problem when the reviewing party has
more information about the cost of production or how production would affect litigants’
strategic positions); see also David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil
Procedure, and the Future of Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1001, 1058 (2021).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
11. Id. 26(b)(2)(B).
12. See id. 26(b)(2)(C).
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In 2015, FRCP amendments on spoliation started requiring prejudice
against the requesting party or that the reviewing party intentionally deprived
the requesting party of information before the court imposes remedies.13 In
each of these FRCP procedures, the reviewing party is interested in the
reviewing party’s discovery methods insofar as the method influences cost
and trustworthiness.14
B. Judges’ Role in E-Discovery
Despite e-discovery’s growing role in litigation, judges remain hesitant to
intervene in the discovery process, preferring that parties resolve discovery
issues without court intervention.15 Evolving TAR raises novel issues
regarding review methodology selection, as exemplified by the two cases
below.
In Kleen Products, LLC v. Packaging Corp. of America, 16 the requesting
and reviewing parties could not agree on ESI search methods.17 The
requesting party argued that the reviewing party’s Boolean keyword
searches18 were subject to inherent inadequacies and flaws that content-based
advanced analytics (CBAA) were not.19 The court pointed out Sedona
Principle Six: the “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the
procedures, methodologies, and techniques appropriate for preserving and
producing their own electronically stored information . . . .” and eventually
13. See id. 37(e).
14. See Steven Bennett, E-Discovery: Reasonable Search, Proportionality, Cooperation,
and Advancing Technology, 30 JOHN MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L. 433, 439–42 (2014).
15. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 609, 633.
16. No. 10-C-5711, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012).
17. Id. at *17–19.
18. See The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and
Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 197–207 (2007)
(explaining that keyword searches and Boolean operators (e.g., “and,” “or,” and “and not,” or
“but not”) underly most common internet search tools, including LexisNexis and Westlaw,
and work by retrieving information based on matches between the search terms and
discoverable material); see also Jacob Tingen, Technologies-That-Must-Not-Be-Named:
Understanding and Implementing Advanced Search Technologies In E-Discovery, 19 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 18–22 (2012) (explaining Boolean connectors allow a user to request
documents with multiple keywords, find specific phrases, or even find keywords within a
specified proximity to each other with wildcard searches that find matches based on a common
root word, e.g., searching “read*” would find documents containing the words “reads,”
“reader,” and “reading”).
19. See Kleen Prods., LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10-C-5711, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139632, at *14–15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (discussing plaintiff’s request that
defendants use CBAA that analyzes the meaning of natural language rather than relying on
keywords). CBAA is also called predictive coding and these algorithms fundamentally differ
from Boolean keyword algorithms. See Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive
Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 S.C. L. REV. 633, 637–42 (2013) (explaining
that conceptual, or content-based, searches use machine-learning algorithms with seeding
documents, which are documents reviewed by a human attorney, that train the algorithm that
predict whether a document is relevant, privileged, and other classifications by recognizing
statistical trends and patterns in the seed set); Tingen, supra note 18, at 21–28 (describing how
content-based TAR relies on statistics to categorize documents’ conceptual meaning, not just
identifying isolated words or phrases as with Boolean searches).
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the requesting party withdrew their demand for CBAA review.20 The nonjudicial and non-legislative Sedona Conference Working Group, comprised
of e-discovery attorneys and other experts, drafted the Sedona Principles,21
so while many practitioners and judges use the Sedona Conference’s
Principles for guidance, judges are not bound by them.
In 2013, a year after the Kleen Products decision, Professor Tonia Murphy
argued against mandating predictive coding in e-discovery.22 She argued
that parties might have legitimate, good-faith concerns that lead them to
prefer keyword searching rather than predictive coding, and judges do not
have sufficient reasons to depart from the traditional judicial role of leaving
discovery decisions to litigants.23
Courts still followed Sedona Principle Six.24 However, Judge Andrew J.
Peck, formerly a magistrate judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, recognized that advancing TAR might change the
traditional discovery dynamics.25 In Hyles v. City of New York,26 the court
held fast to Sedona Principle Six despite believing TAR was the best review
method.27 Even though the judge preferred the reviewing party to have used
TAR in their review, the court did not force the reviewing party to use TAR
because of Sedona Principle Six.28 However, Judge Peck recognized that,
eventually, TAR may be so widely used that it may be unreasonable for a
reviewing party not to use TAR.29
II. RE-CONSIDERING MANDATING TAR
Advances in automated e-discovery, reviewing parties’ burdens,
information asymmetries, and scant FRCP or official guidance forces
reliance on Sedona Principles. This begs the question of when, if ever, should
courts require TAR even if the reviewing party objects?
The answer to this question affects the entire litigation process because
discovery is usually a significant component of any litigation and determines
what facts may be presented to courts or juries.30 Answering this question
will provide efficiency and consistency across courts because litigants and
20. See Kleen Prods., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at *18 (citing The Sedona
Conference, supra note 18, at 196).
21. See The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations &
Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 8–10
(2018).
22. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 609, 614.
23. Id.
24. See Livingston v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-10156, 2020 WL 5253848, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 3, 2020); In re Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litig., No. 16-cv-881, 2020 WL 487288,
at *1, *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2020); Hyles v. New York City, No. 10-CIV-3119, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 100390, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016); Kleen Prods., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
139632, at *6, *18–19, *30–31, *36–37.
25. See Hyles, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390, at *6.
26. See id. at *5.
27. See id.
28. See id. at *7–9.
29. See id. at *10–11.
30. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 609–10.
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judges will have clear guidance for determining when requiring TAR furthers
the FRCP’s just, speedy, and cost-minimizing goals.31
When novel technologies emerge, it is best to wait and see what effects the
new technology has on existing norms and procedures before regulating its
use.32 Once technologies gain traction and disrupt the status quo, however,
issues often emerge, and policies must adapt to these changes.33 Before
electronic information, discovery could entail finding a needle in a haystack.
Now, with ever-increasing electronic information, e-discovery can require
finding a grain of sand in an ocean.34 Although judges’ initial adherence to
the tradition of not intervening in discovery was wise, in light of
technological advances, continuing this tradition does not further just,
speedy, and cost-minimizing goals in all cases in accordance with the
FRCP.35 Particularly, three features of e-discovery present scenarios where
mandating TAR advances the FRCP’s goals: (1) complying with the
proportionality requirements, (2) cost-shifting when appropriate, and (3)
proving spoliation.
This part discusses why parties requesting ESI may care about the
reviewing parties’ review method with the FRCP’s emphasis on
proportionality and spoliation. Part II.A explains that proportionality
showings require cost-benefit analysis and explains how the review method
affects costs. Part II.B highlights the difficulty of making e-discovery
spoliation claims.
A. FRCP 26(b)(1) Proportionality Showing
Requesting parties must show that the information requested is
proportional to the needs of the case.36 Proportionality showings require a
cost-benefit analysis: the financial and resource expenditures of review
methods selected are balanced against the needs of the case and the expected
benefit of the review effort.37 Requesting parties must make proportionality
showings without directly controlling reviewing parties’ review methods and
costs.38 This problem is exacerbated when courts order cost-shifting from
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (explaining the FRCP’s purpose is to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of federal litigation).
32. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404–06, 411–14 (2017)
(explaining the stages regulating emergent technologies).
33. See id. at 422.
34. See Greg Schodde, The E-Discovery Challenge: Finding a Needle as the Haystack
Grows, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 23, 2015, 4:33 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/businessand-practice/the-e-discovery-challenge-finding-a-needle-as-the-haystack-grows
[https://perma.cc/2746-9VCN].
35. See infra Parts II.A–II.B.
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (requiring discovery requests to be relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case).
37. See id. (stating that the factors determining the scope of discovery include “whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
38. See Jacqueline Hoelting, Note, Skin in the Game: Litigation Incentives Changing as
Courts Embrace A “Loser Pays” Rule for E-Discovery Costs, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1103,
1125 (2013).

144

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 90

reviewing parties to requesting parties, because reviewing parties can choose
the most expensive review option, which could limit discovery.39 As the sea
of data expands, requesting parties must make more specific discovery
requests to show relevance and proportionality.40
B. FRCP 37(e): Spoliation
The 2015 FRCP amendments made it harder for requesting parties to show
spoliation even though spoliation issues in e-discovery are considerably more
complex than non-e-discovery spoliation cases.41 The reviewing party’s
good faith is a core component of spoliation showings.42 Because there
might be doubt surrounding the reviewing party’s good faith, the
transparency of review becomes paramount.43
Courts’ continued reliance on the Sedona Principles highlights their need
for precise guidance about using TAR in e-discovery.44 Sedona Principle Six
reflects the discovery status quo of allowing the reviewing party discretion
over review method but does not forbid reviewing parties to choose TAR.45
This cautious recommendation was wise in light of the technological
landscape in 2007, but e-discovery technologies significantly changed since
the Sedona Conference, and their recommendations remained the same in
2018.46 The lack of clear authority on e-discovery increases uncertainty for
litigants because individual judges with varying technical knowledge may
rely on different TAR recommendations.47 Thus, litigants may not know
what to expect.

39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637–38 (1989) (explaining how discovery abuse occurs in the
structure of legal rules).
40. See Rachel K. Alexander, E-Discovery Practice, Theory, and Precedent: Finding the
Right Pond, Lure, and Lines Without Going on a Fishing Expedition, 56 S.D. L. REV. 25, 78
(2011).
41. See Alexander N. Gross, Note, A Safe Harbor from Spoliation Sanctions: Can an
Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) Protect Producing Parties?, 2015 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 705, 733–35 (2015) (explaining the amendments create rules that only apply to
ESI and limit damages to measures necessary to cure prejudice unless the court finds the
party’s spoilation was intentional).
42. See id. at 717–20.
43. See Clare Kealey, Discovering Flaws: An Analysis of the Amended Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(e) and Its Impact on the Spoliation of Electronically Stored Evidence, 14
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 147 (2016).
44. See In re Mercedes-Benz Emissions Litig., No. 16-cv-881, 2020 WL 487288, at *1,
*6 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2020); Livingston v. City of Chicago, No. 16-cv-10156, 2020 WL
5253848, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020); Hyles v. New York City, No. 10-CIV-3119, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100390, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016); Kleen Prods., LLC v. Packaging
Corp. of Am., No. 10-C-5711, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139632, at *6, *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
28, 2012).
45. See The Sedona Principles, supra note 21, at 8–10.
46. See id.
47. See Scott M. O’Brien, Note, Analog Solutions: E-Discovery Spoliation Sanctions and
the Proposed Amendments to FRCP 37(e), 65 DUKE L.J. 151, 184 (2015).
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III. EMPOWERING COURTS TO PROTECT ADVERSARIAL DISCOVERY
Since TAR affects costs and trustworthiness in discovery, courts need
specific guidelines about mandating TAR in e-discovery.48 Discovery is a
gatekeeping mechanism to more expensive parts of litigation and occurs in
trial courts.49 Therefore, e-discovery expert guidance for trial courts would
be beneficial.50 A first step for courts would be establishing practical ediscovery guidance based on current FRCP rules. Two specific issues
warrant immediate consideration: assessing costs during a proportionality
analysis and when spoliation occurs.
This part argues mandating TAR in some cases may be appropriate and
that judges need technical guidance to intervene, if needed, in e-discovery
disputes. Part III.A discusses requiring TAR in proportionality showings
when the requesting party pays discovery costs. Part III.B considers
mandating TAR in spoliation cases where the reviewing party’s good faith
may be at issue.
A. Addressing Proportionality
The current FRCP shift costs onto the requesting party if the reviewing
party can show an undue cost and require that judges limit discovery
obligations of the producing party if the requesting party can find the
information from less expensive sources.51 FRCP 26’s plain language does
not forbid requesting parties from considering TAR in their cost-benefit
proportionality analysis.52 Indeed, the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct require attorneys to stay informed of evolving
legal technology.53 In light of courts applying these rules where the
reviewing party chooses the review method, reviewing parties do not have
an incentive to choose the lowest cost review method because the requesting
party pays.54 Instead, the reviewing party can keep e-discovery costs high,
so the requesting party will fail the proportionality test and pay the reviewing
party’s discovery costs.55 The FRCP’s guidance should rectify potential
abuse from e-discovery cost-shifting and bad faith review methods by
providing judges with detailed guidance for assessing different review
methods, specifically concept-based TAR versus keyword or manual review.
Additionally, judges need to know TAR’s limitations to determine when a
party has a good faith argument against TAR. Expanding TAR cost-benefit
guidance for judges maintains judicial discretion while equipping judges
48. See supra Parts II.A–II.B.
49. See Daniel K. Gelb, The Court as Gatekeeper: Preventing Unreliable Pretrial
eDiscovery From Jeopardizing a Reliable Fact-Finding Process, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287,
1290–91 (2014).
50. See id.
51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B).
52. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
53. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
54. See Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 636 (explaining the strategic components of
discovery).
55. See id.
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with the knowledge necessary for informed cost-based e-discovery rulings.
Furthermore, understanding the nuances of TAR’s costs and benefits will
mitigate frivolous discovery, rather than open the floodgates to fishing
expeditions. Understanding these factors allows adjusting the scope of
discovery to the anticipated value of the case and avoiding e-discovery
disputes over review methods.
B. Mitigating Spoliation
When spoliation concerns arise, judges need to “lockdown” information to
ensure requesting parties have fair access to information.56 Unlike paper
records which courts can physically secure, electronic information in the
cloud can exist in other jurisdictions.57 Judicial intervention may be
necessary in spoliation cases when a party challenges whether the other party
is acting in good faith.58 The 2015 FRCP amendments make requesting
parties’ spoliation showings more burdensome without considering the
unique difficulties of showing ESI spoliation.59 Mandating TAR in
spoliation cases would help deter the reviewing party from abusing the
review process or destroying ESI by ensuring good faith with oversight.
Creating detailed court guidance for storing ESI and conducting forensic
analysis of lost ESI in spoliation cases will protect against the reviewing
parties abusing their information or technology advantage. These guidelines
should include specific, tangible procedures judges or mediators should use
to secure and access ESI, including the time limits for recovering data.
Developing these spoliation guidelines will assist courts in exercising just
rulings and increase certainty for litigants through notice of the ratified
procedures, and signals to litigants that courts are embracing TAR and
expanding their technical expertise. These signals will further establish
norms for advancing TAR and warn technology-savvy litigants to stay away
from e-discovery abuse. Establishing technical knowledge and guidelines
for spoliation cases will lay a foundation to confront other problems in ediscovery, like the duty to preserve evidence and inadvertent disclosures.
CONCLUSION
Current e-discovery rules and guidance should be updated to account for
advanced TAR methods, particularly concept-based review.60 The lack of
56. See JOSEPH S. GOODE & EMILY BRIDGES, AM. BAR ASS’N, W2: LITIGATION TRAP:
PREVENTING, PROSECUTING, AND DEFENDING A CLAIM OF SPOLIATION 19 (2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/franchising/2020/w2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JT4B-3376].
57. See Paul M. Schwartz, Legal Access to the Global Cloud, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1681,
1700 (2018) (explaining how the instability of data access rules leaves multiple ways to shelter
data beyond American law).
58. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
59. See Alexandra M. Reynolds, Note, Spoliating the Adverse Inference Instruction: The
Impact of the 2015 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), 51 GA. L. REV. 917,
930 (2017).
60. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
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clear, practical guidance forces judges to rely on non-ratified documents like
the Sedona Principles or traditions, like cooperation, based on non-electronic
information.61 Courts’ hesitancy to participate in e-discovery disputes
threatens the adversarial nature of litigation in American law and the
sacrosanct role of lawyers in discovery.62 Since ESI requests are the starting
place for all e-discovery, proportionality and cost-shifting are natural places
to start expanding courts’ technical knowledge.63 Spoliation should also be
an initial consideration because these cases disrupt good faith assumptions,
which likely affects litigant cooperation.64 E-discovery and TAR are here to
stay, and it is time for courts to catch up.65

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See supra notes 45–46, 58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts II.A, III.A.
See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts II.A, III.A.
See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts II.B, III.B.
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.

